Ibn Sina: Qiyās iii.1

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based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al.
(DRAFT ONLY)

4 November 2012

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<div dir="rtl">

في القياسات المختلطة من الإطلاق والضرورة

</div>

iii.1 On mixed syllogisms with absolute and necessary   125.5

<div dir="rtl">

قد قلنا في هذه القياسات: إذا كانت مطلقة وإذا كانت ضروريّة.

</div>

[3.1.1] We have already spoken about these syllogisms when they con-   125.6
sist of absoluteness propositions and when they consist of necessity propo-
sitions.
{*Prior Anal* i.9, 30a15.}

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وبقيت المختلطات من الضربين في جملة ما بقي. فلنتكلّم في المختلطات إذا كانت

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Among the remaining cases there are the syllogisms that consist of a mix-
ture of the two kinds of proposition. So let us talk about the mixed syllo-
gisms where

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إحدى مقدّماتها مطلقة والأخرى ضروريّة.

</div>

one of the premises is an absoluteness proposition and the other is a neces-
sity proposition.

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ولنبدأ بالضرب الأوّل من الشكل

</div>

[3.1.2] Let us begin with the first mood in   125.8

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الأوّل الّذي من كلّيّتين موجبتين صغراهما مطلقة وكبراهما ضروريّة. مثاله كلّ ج
ب

</div>

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first figure, which has two universally quantified affirmative premises, with the minor premise an absoluteness proposition and the major premise a necessity proposition. For example:

(1)
    Every C is a B, i.e. with absoluteness;
    and every B is an A with necessity.
    Then we say: Every C is an A with necessity.

أتي بالإطلاق، وكلّ ب‬ آ بالضرورة. فنقول: إنّ كلّ ج‬ آ بالضرورة،

ونقول أوّلا: إنّا قد كنّا نأخذ المطلقة فيما سلف عامّة لما بالضرورة ولما ليس

[3.1.3] Our first comment is that we have been taking 'absolute proposition' in the above as including both necessary propositions and

بالضرورة، وإذا أخذناها الآن كذلك إختلط، فما كان من ذلك يوافق مادّة

propositions that are not necessary. When we take them like that now, they form mixtures. Some of them correspond to necessary matter;
{So what does an absoluteness proposition say? }

الضرورة كان حكمها حكم الضرورة، وما يوافق مادّة لا ضرورة فيها إختلف.

these are the ones whose content is necessary. Some of them correspond to non-necessary matter; these are different.

فليعن ههنا بالمطلقات، ما كان من المطلقات غير ضروري. فما كان يلزم من

By 'absolute' let us mean here those absolute propositions that are not necessity propositions. When the mixture of an absoluteness proposition with a necessity one

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خلطها بالضرورة نتيجة ضروريّة، علمت أنّ ذلك حكم الخلط الّذي من المطلقة

entails a necessary conclusion, you know that the mixture is tantamount to
the mixture of a necessity proposition and a general absoluteness proposi-
tion.

العامّة. وما كان يلزم منها مطلقة، علمت أنّك لو أخذتها عامّة لزمت مطلقة عامّة

In the case where it entails an absolute conclusion, you know that if you
take [the premises] as general [absoluteness] propositions, then what fol-
lows is a general absoluteness proposition,

ولم تلزم ضروريّة. ثمّ تكون المسافة مقربة. فإنّه لو كانت المطلقة العامّة توجب

and no necessity proposition follows. [In each case] the distance [travelled
by the syllogism] will be minimal. In fact if a general absoluteness premise
entails [with the other premise] a

ضرورة، لكانت توجد في كلّ جزئيّ لها. فكانت توجد في هذه الخاصّة الّتي هي

necessity proposition, then each individual instance of it is true, and so
each special case [of the conclusion] holds as

جزئيّة تحت العامّة.

an individual case under the general.   126.5

فنقول: إنّ قوما تعجّبوا من كون هذه النتيجة ضروريّة،

[3.1.4] We say: People have been surprised that this conclusion is a ne-   126.5
cessity proposition

وإستبعدوا هذا المذهب. وإنّما غرّهم شيء واحد، وذلك لأنّهم حسبوا أنّ

and they have regarded this way of reasoning as implausible. There is just
one thing that misleads them, namely that they reckon that

الضروري ههنا كلّ ما كان ضروريّا ما دام ذات الموضوع موجودا،

the necessary in this case is anything that is necessary for so long as the
essence of the subject individual continues to be satisfied,

{Here Ibn Sīnā gives evidence for what he says at *Burhān* 123.14ff and else-
where, that essential and descriptional propositions are counted as abso-
lute in *Qiyās* but necessary in *Burhān*. The point here is that descriptional
propositions don't behave like necessary ones in this kind of argument. It's
not clear what he has against essential propositions here. A common view

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today is that the temptation to reject this mixed mood comes from reading the modalities as de dicto. But Ibn Sīnā is emphatic that de dicto modalities should not be mentioned in the same breath as the Aristotelian modal syllogisms, e.g. *Qiyās* 142.13f. A further point: his complaint is in part that people don't distinguish the essential from the descriptional, cf. 126.14ff below. This confirms that Theophrastus, Themistius etc. had an ambiguous formulation. }

أو ضروريّا ما دام موصوفا بما يوصف به. حتّى إذا قيل: إنّ كلّ أبيض فهو

or that is necessary for so long as the subject individual continues to fit the description given for it. So when it is said that

(2)   Every white thing has with necessity a colour that opens out to the eye.

بالضرورة ذو لون مفرّق للبصر، حسبوه ضروريّا حقيقيّا. وكذلك إذا قيل:

they reckon it is a genuine necessity proposition. And likewise when it is said:

بالضرورة لا شيء من الأبيض أسود، حسبوه ضروريّا حقيقيّا. وكانوا إذا

(3)   With necessity nothing white is black.

they reckon it is a genuine necessity proposition. But when   126.10

قالوا: زيد أبيض، وكلّ أبيض فهو بالضرورة ذو لون مفرّق للبصر، لم ينطج

they say

(4)   Zayd is white;
      and everything white is necessarily of a colour that opens out to the eye.

it doesn't entail

لهم: أنّ زيدا ذو لون مفرّق للبصر بالضرورة، وإلّا فزيد أبيض بالضرورة.

for them that

(5)   Zayd is of a colour that opens out to the eye, with necessity.

since that would say that Zayd is white with necessity.

فكذلك إنّما كان ينتج لهم في مثال الأسود أنّ زيدا ليس أسود بالضرورة.

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So likewise for them it would just follow from (3) [and the necessity of the conclusion of this mood] that

(6)   Zayd is not black, with necessity.

وكلّ هذا لأنّهم لم يشتغلوا بإستثبات حقيقة المقول على الكلّ قولا ضروريّا،

All this is because they don't take the trouble to establish the facts about universally quantified propositions that are necessity propositions.

حتّى يفطنوا للفرق بين قولنا: كلّ أبيض فهو بالضرورة ذو لون مفرّق للبصر،

[If they did,] they would realise the difference between [two meanings of] the sentence   126.15

(7)   Everything white is, with necessity, of a colour that opens out to the eye.

إذ معناه ما يوصف بأنّه أبيض، كيف وصف بانّه أبيض، فإنّه ما دام ذاته موجودا،

[The first case is] when its meaning is that whatever thing fits the description 'white', regardless of how that description is given, and so long as the essence of the thing continues to be satisfied,
{NB Explication by expansion. }

كان أبيض أو لم يكن أبيض، فهو ذو لون مفرّق للبصر. أو كلّ ما يوصف بأنّه أبيض

and regardless of whether or not it is white [at the time], that thing has a colour that opens out to the eye. The other [meaning is that] everything that fits the description 'white'

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كيف كان فما دام أبيض فبالضرورة هو ذو لون مفرّق للبصر، ⟦أو بالضرورة

in any way, for as long as it remains white, has with necessity a colour which opens out to the eye; or [that every such thing, for as long as it remains white,] is with necessity

ليس بأسود.⟧ وأنت تعلم ممّا سلف لك أنّ بين الإعتبارات فرقانا، وكيف وأوّلها

not black. You know from the discussion above that you can tell the two interpretations apart by the obvious fact that the first of them

{At *ᶜIbāra* 115.11 Ibn Sīnā describes a criterion for distinguishing interpretations (viz. one of them can be doubted but the other can't). But this criterion wasn't used to distinguish necessary from wasfy-with-necessary-predicate as here. }

كاذب.

is false.

ولو كانوا قالوا في كبراهم: إنّ كلّ أبيض بالضرورة فهو ذو لون

[3.1.5] If they had made their major premise   127.3

(8)   Everything that is white with necessity, that thing has a colour which opens out to the eye with necessity.

{NB Quantification over modalised subject; the mode is necessity. }

مفرّق للبصر بالضرورة، لكان أيضا حقّا. لكن لم يكن ألحق الأوسط حينئذ

then that too would be true. But the middle term in that case is not

{I can't interpret the *'lḥq*. Is it 'the truth' or 'attached'? }

مشتركا فيه؛ وذلك لأنّ الأبيض بالضرورة ليس محمولا على زيد، بل الأبيض

common [to the two premises], because what is predicated of Zayd [in the   127.5 minor premise] is not 'white with necessity' but 'white

الّذي ليس بالضرورة أو الأبيض بلا شرط، فإن حذفوا هذه الزيادة كانت

without necessity' or 'white' without any condition. If they suppressed this addition

الكبرى كاذبة. لأنّك لا يمكنك أن تقول: إنّ كلّ أبيض بالضرورة أو بغير

the major premise would be false, because you can't say that

(9)   Everything that with or without necessity is white has a colour
         that opens out to the eye with necessity.

الضرورة فهو ذو لون مفرّق للبصر بالضرورة. فقولك: » كلّ أبيض «، يشملها

When you say 'Every white thing', that includes both [things that are necessarily white and things that are white without necessity]

جميعا، فلا يمكن أن نقول: كلّ أبيض فهو بالضرورة ذو لون مفرّق للبصر.

together, so we can't say

(10)   Every white thing has with necessity a colour which opens out
         to the eye.

لكنّ العادة المجازيّة هي الّتي غلّطته.

But the custom of using words in extended senses is what causes the error.   127.10
{Cf. *ᶜIbāra* 101.7 on the *ᶜādatu l-majāziyya* and Aristotle's attitude to it. Also
Qiyās 67.9 on extended senses of 'necessary'. }

فإذا قلنا: كلّ جّ بّ ، ثمّ قلنا: كلّ

[3.1.6] So when we say   127.10

(11)   Every C is a B.

and then we say

ما هو بّ بالضرورة أو بغير الضرورة بعد أن يكون بّ كان وقتا ما أو دائما

(12)   Everything that is either with necessity or without necessity a B,
         given that it is a B, regardless of whether that is temporarily or
         permanently, is an A with necessity and permanently.

فهو آ بالضرورة دائما، دخل جّ في المقول على الكلّ. فكدلك إذا قلنا: كلّ

then [it follows that] C is included in whatever is said of every [B]. Likewise when we say

(13)   Every B [is a C].

ب مطلقا الّذي يعمّهما جميعا، فوجب أن يكون كلّ ج آ بالضرورة.

as an absoluteness proposition which includes both cases together, then it has to be that

(14)   Every C is an A with necessity.

الضرب الثاني كذلك. ولكنّ الكبرى مطلقة تنتج مطلقة. مثاله كلّ ج ب

[3.1.7] The second mood is the same [as the first], except that the major   127.14
premise is the one that is an absoluteness premise, and it entails an abso-
luteness conclusion. An example is

        Every C is a B with necessity;
(15)   and every B is an A with absoluteness;
        so every C is an A with absoluteness.

بالضرورة، وكلّ ما هو ب فهو آ بالإطلاق، فكلّ ج آ بالإطلاق؛

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لأنّه قد حكم على كلّ ما هو بَ بالضرورة أو غير الضرورة أنّه بالإطلاق آ ، فيكون

This is because it is given that everything that is a B is with absoluteness an A, regardless of whether it is a B with or without necessity. So

كلّ جَ آ بالإطلاق.

every C is an A with absoluteness.

وهذه المطلقة لا يصحّ أن يكون معناها كلّ ما هو بَ

[3.1.8] It is not correct that the meaning of the absoluteness premise is that everything that is a B is an A with absoluteness
{In this paragraph he examines various possible refinements of the mood just stated. They take the form of narrowing the major premise; since the mood is valid, they will therefore be valid too. I don't know why he doesn't just say this. Odd also that the rest of the paragraph seems to be based on the assumption that the major premise is a descriptional, which is certainly not required for validity. }

فهو ما دام بَ فقط لا دائما فهو آ بالإطلاق. وذلك لأنّه ليس كلّ ما هو بَ

but only for as long as it is a B, not permanently. That is because not everything that is a B

لا يدوم له أنّه بَ ؛ إذ قلنا: إنّ بعض ما هو بَ ، وهو الّذي هو جَ ، هو بَ

fails to be a B permanently. In fact we have said [in the minor premise] that something that is a B, namely what is a C, is a B

بالضرورة دائما. فلا يصحّ إذن بعد ذلك القول، قولنا: كلّ ما يوصف ب بَ يكون

with necessity and permanently. In the light of this it is not correct for us to   128.5
say

(16)   Everything that fits the description B is an A at some time, namely the time during which it fits the description B.

له آ وقتا ما، وذلك الوقت هو كونه موصوفا ب بَ . فإنّ بعض ما يوصف

In fact [given the minor premise,] some of what fits the description

ب بَ يوصف به دائما. لكن يمكن أن توجد هذه المقدّمة مطلقة المطلقة الّتي

B fits that description permanently. It can be that this [major] premise is true absolutely, with the kind of absoluteness that

يكون فيها ضرورة ولا ضرورة، كقولنا: كلّ متحرّك فهو متغيّر، ولا يصحّ

allows the premise to be either a necessary truth or not one. Thus when we say

(17)   Everything that moves changes.

it is not correct

أن نقول: إنّه متغيّر بالضرورة، ولا ما دام متحرّكا وليس دائما؛ بل في وقت

for us to say

(18)   [Everything that moves] changes with necessity, not while it continues to move, nor permanently, but for the non-permanent amount of time during which it does move.

كونه متحرّكا الّذي لا يدوم له: إذ كان بعض ذلك يدوم ذاته متحرّكا، وبعضه

This is because some moving things have a permanently moving essence   128.10 and some

لا يدوم؛ وكذلك يكون بعضه متغيّرا بالضرورة، وبعض لا بالضرورة. فلا يصحّ

don't. Likewise some moving things change with necessity, and some moving things change but not with necessity. Nor is it correct

أن نقول: إنّ الكلّ كذلك بالضرورة، ولا إنّ الكلّ كذلك لا بالضرورة؛ بل

for us to say

(19)   Everything that moves changes with necessity.

nor

(20)   Everything that moves changes without necessity.

Instead we should say that the premise holds

نقول: مطلقا. ويكون الإطلاق العامّ. فإذا صدقت هذه المقدّمة على هذه الصفة،

absolutely; this is an example of broad absoluteness. But then if this premise is true when read as a broad absoluteness proposition,

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وكان كلّ ما هو بَ آ بالإطلاق من هذا الوجه، كانت النتيجة، مع أنّها

so that every B is an A with this kind of absoluteness, the conclusion follows, and moreover it is

مطلقة ضروريّة. لأنّ هذه النتيجة تكون مطلقة كالكبرى، أيّ مطلقة عامّة،

necessarily an absoluteness proposition. This is because this conclusion   128.15
will hold as the same kind of absolute as the major premise, i.e. broad absolute.
{Appalling exegesis to use *ḍarūriyyatan* this way, if my translation is correct.}

فيكون كلّ جَ آ ما دام موصوفا بأنّه بَ ، لكنّه يدوم له الإتّصاف ب بَ ،
فيدوم

Thus every C will be an A so long as it continues to fit the description B.
But [by the minor premise] it permanently fits the description B, so it is
permanently

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له كونه آ . مثال ذلك: الثلج أبيض بالضرورة، وكلّ أبيض فإنّه ملوّن بلون

an *A*. An example of this is:

> Snow is white with necessity;
> and everything white is coloured with a colour which opens out
> (21)   to the eye, with the absoluteness that we said;
> so all snow is coloured with a colour that opens out to the eye,
> permanently.

مفرّق للبصر بالإطلاق كما قلنا، فكلّ ثلج ملوّن بلون مفرّق للبصر دائما.

{NB Here he uses 'permanently' and 'with necessity' as synonyms. }

فليتعمّل هذا من يتعجّب من إنتاج الضرورة عن صغرى مطلقة وكبرى ضروريّة.

Anyone who is surprised at getting a necessity conclusion from an abso-
luteness minor premise and a necessity major premise should take a close
look at this.

فإنّه يجد الضروريّة تنتج عن كبرى مطلقة إذا كانت الصغرى ضروريّة.

He will find a necessity proposition derived from an absoluteness major
premise when the minor premise is a necessity proposition.

الضرب الثالث: صغراه كلّيّة موجبة مطلقة، وكبراه كلّيّة سالبة ضروريّة.

[3.1.9] The third mood: Its minor premise is a universally quantified   129.5
affirmative absoluteness proposition and its major premise is a universally
quantified negative necessity proposition.

مثاله: كلّ ج ب بالإطلاق، ولا شيء من ب آ بالضرورة. ينتج بالضرورة

For example:

> Every *C* is a *B* with absoluteness;
> (22)   and no *B* is an *A*, with necessity.
> It follows that with necessity no *C* is an *A*.

لا شيء من ج آ ،كما قد علّمت.

[It behaves] as you have already learned.
{I.e. for the first mood. }

والضرب الرابع عكسه في الضرورة والإطلاق: كلّ جـ بـ بالضرورة،

[3.1.10] The fourth mood is the same but with the necessity and the   129.8
absoluteness the other way round:

Every C is a B with necessity;
(23)   and no B is an A, with absoluteness.
It entails: No C is an A.

ولا شيء من بـ آ بالإطلاق ينتج: لا شيء من جـ آ . وعلى ما علّمت

It behaves as you have learned

في الضرب الثاني.

for the second mood.   129.10

والخامس صغراه جزئيّة موجبة مطلقة، وكبراه كلّيّة موجبة ضروريّة.

[3.1.11] The fifth mood: its minor premise is an existentially quantified   129.11
affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major premise is a universally
quantified affirmative necessity proposition.

والسادس عكسها في الضرورة والإطلاق.

[3.1.12] The sixth mood is the same but with the necessity and the abso-   129.12
luteness the other way round.

والسابع صغراه جزئيّة موجبة مطلقة، وكبراه ضروريّة سالبة كلّيّة.

[3.1.13] The seventh mood: its minor premise is an existentially quan-   129.13
tified affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major is a negative uni-
versally quantified necessity proposition.

والثامن عكسه في الضرورة والإتلاق. والنتائج نابعة للكبرى.

[3.1.14] The eighth mood is the same but with the necessity and the   129.14
absoluteness the other way round. Its conclusions take their form from the
major premise.

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وإعلم أنّ الجزئيّة المطلقة لا تمنع الضرورة، ولا الجزئيّة الضروريّة تمنع الإتلاق.

[3.1.15] Know that an existentially quantified absoluteness proposition 　130.1
doesn't say that [its content] is not necessary, and an existentially quantified
necessity proposition doesn't say that [its content] is not absolute.

فإنّ الجزئيّتين إذا كانتا لا تتمانعان في السلب والإيجاب فكيف ‬ [لا] تتمانعان

In fact, given that neither the negative nor the affirmative existentially quan-
tified propositions place such a restriction, how can we suppose that when
they don't place such a restriction

في الضرورة والإطلاق، ويمتنع فيهما المعنى المذكور في الضرب الثاني.

either when they are necessity propositions or when they are absoluteness
propositions, they still deny that [their content] has the the meaning re-
ferred to in our discussion of the second mood?
{I take him to be saying that the existentially quantified propositions are
compatible with the descriptional reading, and using as evidence the fact
already discussed, that they are compatible with the content being absolute
and with its being necessary. This requires adding a *lā* in line 130.2 without
ms evidence, but noting that one ms omits the earlier *lā* in the same context
earlier in the line. }

[Second figure]

وأمّا الشكل الثاني، فالحقّ فيه أنّه إذا إختلفت القضيّتان في الضرورة والإطلاق

[3.1.16] We consider the second figure. The truth about it is that when 　130.4
the two propositions differ in that one is a necessity proposition and the
other is a narrow absoluteness
{*Prior Anal* i.10, 30b7. But he starts with new material and picks up Aristo-
tle only at 131.7. }

الخاصّ، وكانتا كلّيّتين، فقيل الأوسط بالضرورة على كلّ واحد من طرف،

proposition, and they are both universally quantified, then the middle term 　130.5
is applied, with necessity, to all the individuals under one of the extreme
terms,

ثمّ قيل على كلّ واحد من الطرف الآخر بغير ضرورة، على ما جوّزه صاحب

and then it is applied to all the individuals under the other extreme term

but not with necessity, according to what was allowed by a person given to

الفصّ أيضا، فكان لأحد الطرفين حكم الأوسط عند كلّ موصوف، هو أنّه

detailed analysis. So for one of the two extreme terms, the content of the middle term applies to everything that satisfies the extreme term, and it applies to it

دائم له، وعلى الآخر هو أنّه ليس دائما له أيّ لكلّ واحد واحد منه، كان

permanently; and for the other extreme term, the middle term applies to [each thing that satisfies the extreme term], but in each case it doesn't apply permanently.
{So he says. But does he mean it is not asserted to apply permanently? }

الحكم سلبا أو إيجابا. فإنّ الطرفين متباعدان يجب سلب كلّ واحد منهما عن

The content can be either denied or affirmed. In fact the extreme terms are disjoint from each other, and each of them has to be denied of
{NB He is confused about whether the *ḥukm* includes the quality. In 130.7 the *ḥukm* was 'the *ḥukm* of the middle term', but now the *ḥukm* is either a denial or an affirmation.}

الآخر. وكذلك إن كانت الصغرى جزئيّة. فإنّ البعض الّذي فيها مسلوب عن

the other. And likewise if the minor premise is existentially quantified, then   130.10
the 'some' which is in the minor premise is denied of

الطرف الأكثر؛ إذ كان ذلك البعض مخالفا له في الحكم.

the major extreme term, because this some and the major term are incompatible with respect to the content [in the middle term].

وأنت إذا جعلت

[3.1.17] If you count   130.11
{NB Counting the modality as part of the predicate so as to form a syllogism. Why? In any case it won't work if the modalities in the two premises are different (this being in second figure). }

الدوام وغير الدوام جزءا من المحمول فكان الإقتران، مثلا قولك: كلّ ج ‾ب‾

the permanence or non-permanence as a part of the predicate, it forms a premise-pair, as when you say

(24)   Every C is a B with necessity;
and every A is a B with necessity.

15

{Curious he chooses a non-productive premise-pair, twice. I suspect he was careless about the negations. }

بالضرورة، وكلّ آ بّ بالضرورة، أو بالضرورة لا شيء من جّ بّ ،

or

> With necessity no C is a B;

(25)   and no A is a B, where the negation applies to each individual but not with necessity.

ولا شيء من آ بّ سلبا هو في كلّ واحد لا بالضرورة؛ أمكن أن تقول: كلّ

If you do this, you could say

ما يقال له آ ، فيحمل عليه أنّه دائما بّ . ولا شيء ممّا يقال له جّ يحمل عليه أنّه

> Everything which satisfies the phrase A has predicated of it that it is permanently a B;

(26)   and nothing which satisfies the phrase C has predicated of it that it is permanently a B; This entails that no C is an A.

130.15

دائما بّ ، فينتج أنّه لا شيء من جّ آ . وكذلك لو قلت كلّ ما يقال له

And likewise if you said

> Everything which satisfies the phrase C is a thing of which it is permanently denied that it is a B;

(27)   and nothing which satisfies the phrase A is a thing of which it is permanently denied that it is a B; it follows that no A is a B, and that is with necessity.

جّ فهو شيء، ذلك الشيء يسلب دائما عنه أنّه بّ ، وليس شيء ممّا يقال

{NB *šay'* here seems to be a concrete individual, but I guess this is a straight quantifier usage. }

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عليه آ ، فهو شيء، ذلك الشيء يسلب دائما عنه أنّه بَ ، أنتج ليس آ بَ ، وذلك

بالضرورة. فإنّك يمكنك أن تجعل بدل قولك شيء مسلوب عنه كذا إنّما مفردا.

Then you can put a single noun in place of the phrase 'thing of which it is denied etc.'.

{NB Using a single noun as short for a phrase.}

وحينئذ يمكنك أن تزيد جهة الضرورة في جميع ذلك، وينتج ضروريّة.

In this way you can add the modality of necessity in all of this, and it entails a necessity proposition.

{Presumably he is describing how modalities can be thought of as being added to assertoric syllogisms. ?? }

وأمّا إذا أخذت العامّة مطلقة، لم يجب أن ينتج من موجبتين أو سالبتين، لأنّه

[3.1.18] When you take a general absoluteness proposition [as premise], the syllogism with two affirmative premises or two negative premises shouldn't be productive, because

{Read *al-muṭlaqata l-ᶜāmmata* with one ms. Very possibly Ibn Sīnā intended this but wrote carelessly. The paragraph frankly looks like an unfinished note to himself. }

يمكن أن تكون تلك المطلقة تصدق على ضروريّة، وفي تلك المادّة لا تجب

that kind of absoluteness proposition can be true with a content that is   131.5 necessarily true, and with that matter [in the absoluteness premise] there doesn't have to be

نتيجة. وهذا معنى أنّه لا ينتج.

a conclusion. And this means that the syllogism is not productive.

فلنعدّ إلى إقتصاص المشهور في ذلك.

[3.1.19] Let us review precisely what is the the standard position about   131.6 [the second] figure.

الضرب الأوّل من ذلك: كلّ جَ بَ بالإطلاق، وبالضرورة لا شيء من

The first mood of the figure is: 131.7

(28)   Every C is a B with absoluteness;
and with necessity no A is a B.

{Cesare. Proved as assertoric case, by converting major premise so as to get Celarent.}

آب، فينعكس إلى الأوّل، فينتج: أنّه بالضرورة لا شيء من جَ آ . وهذا

It converts to the first figure, and thus it entails

(29)   No C is an A.

{The conversion

لا منازعة فيه.

This is uncontroversial.

{I.e. given the controversial position that 'No B is an A, with necessity' converts.}

والثاني أن تجعل السالبة الضروريّة صغرى.

[3.1.20] The second mood is where you put the negative necessity proposition as the minor premise.   131.10

{Camestres, proved like the assertoric case by converting the minor premise to get Celarent. }

وأمّا الثالث فمثل قولنا: كلّ جَ بَ بالضرورة، ولا شيء من آ بَ بالإطلاق

[3.1.21] The third mood takes the form   131.11

(30)   Every C is a B with necessity;
and no A is a B, with the absoluteness which excludes necessity.

{Cesare again, but with necessity on the affirmative premise we can get a necessity conclusion. }

الغير الضروري. وليكن ممّا ينعكس حتّى يكون فيه تمام المقارنة. وما ينعكس

Suppose [the major premise] is convertible, so that the premise and its converse are completely parallel.

ممّا ليس بضروري لا يجوز أن يكون إلّا نوعا من المطلقة الصرفة، أو يكون
بمعنى

Among non-necessary propositions, a proposition that converts can only be a kind of pure absolute, or its meaning is

<div dir="rtl">

ما حصل في الوجود وقتا ما، حتّى ينعكس على نحو ما قيل.

</div>

that something was the case at some particular time, so that it converts in
the way that was said.

{Reference back to ii.1, but I haven't yet sorted out exactly where. }

<div dir="rtl">

فأمّا إن كانت الكبرى مطلقة بالمعنى الأوّل فقد علم أنّها إذا إنعكست صارت

</div>

[3.1.22] When the major premise is absolute in the first meaning, it was   131.15
already known that when it converts, it becomes

<div dir="rtl">

ولا شيء من بَ آ ، ما دام موصوفا بأنّه بَ ، وكلّ جَ بَ دائما، فينتج كما علمت

</div>

(31)   No B is an A at any time while it continues to fit the description
       B.

But [in (30)] every C is a B permanently, and so as you know, the syllogism
entails

<div dir="rtl">

ضروريّة.

</div>

a necessity conclusion.

{This is another example of the descriptional argument, though did he ac-
tually mention descriptional Celarent? }

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وأمّا إن كانت على الجهة الثانيّة فتكون حقيقيّة التأليف فيها أنّ كلّ ج

[3.1.23] We turn to the second kind of convertible absolute proposition.   132.1
The essence of the composed syllogism in this case is

(32)
    Everything that in any point or interval of time is a C fits the
    description B permanently for as long as its essence continues
    to be satisfied, not just for as long as it continues to satisfy the
    description B;
    and nothing that satisfies A at a certain time has B true of it.

في كلّ وقت وزمان، فإنّه موصوف بأنّه بَ دائما ما دام ذاته موجودا لا ما دام

موصوفا بأنّه بَ فقط. ولا شيء من الموجودين آ في زمان ما موجود له أنّه

بَ. فيجب أن يمتنع أن يكون شيء من ج آ ، عند كون القضيّة السالبة صحيحة

This is supposed to prevent there being any C which is an A under the
assumption that the negative proposition is

موجودة، وإلّا لكان في كلّ زمان يوجد فيه ذاته يوجد له أنّه بَ ، وفي هذا

factually true. Otherwise [there is such a C, and] at every time in which its   132.5
essence is satisfied, it satisfies B, and this includes

الزمان أيضا. ويشبه أن لا يحسن أن تعكس هذه المقدّمة عكسا، حتّى يتألّف

the time in question. But it is fair to say that it would not win approval if
we were to convert this premise so as to compose

منه قياس في الشكل الأوّل على جهة أن يقال: كلّ ج كيف كان فإنّه موصوف

a syllogism in the first figure along the lines

(33)
    Everything that is a C, under any circumstances, fits the descrip-
    tion B permanently;
    and nothing that is a B, under any circumstances, has A false of
    it at the given time.

بأنّه بَ دائما، وكلّ بَ كيف كان مسلوبا عنه آ في هذا الوقت. فإنّ الكبرى

The major premise

حينئذ ـ فيما أحسب ـ لا تكون مطلقة على أحد المذهبين؛ بل إنّما يجب أن يقال:

in (33), on my reckoning, isn't an absolute of either of the two types [that we are considering]. [For an absolute major premise] one would have to say

كلّ ب̄ موجود في هذا الوقت مسلوبا عنه آ .فحينئذ لا يجب أن يدخل

(34)   Every B which exists at the given time has A false of it.

But it doesn't follow from this that the class C is included in   132.10
{I think he probably means 'Everything that exists and is a B at the given time'. }

ج̄ تحت ب̄ . فربّما لم يكن ج̄ موصوفا بأنّه ب̄ في هذا الوقت، إذا لم يكن ذاته

[the subject class of the major premise], since it could be that the individual C doesn't fit the description B at the given time, because its essence is not
{For 'the subject ... major premise' the text has 'B'. This is probably Ibn Sīnā writing carelessly. }

موجودا في هذا الوقت. فعلى طريقتهم ـ حينئذ ـ لا تكون النتيجة مطلقة على شرط

satisfied at that time. So if we did follow them in this line of reasoning, the conclusion would not be absolute, [because of the required] condition

وجود الموضوع. نعم إن كان ج̄ موجودا في هذا الوقت فيسلب عنه أنّه

about the existence of the subject individual. Granted, if the C exists at the given time then it is not
{NB Here it's explicit that he is discussing syllogisms with conditions added. In this line he seems to be returning to the form in 132.1, abandoning the pseudo-converse suggested in 132.10. }

آ في هذا الوقت، ولا يلزم أن يسلب عنه في كلّ وقت. مثلا إذا كان

an A at that time, but it doesn't follow that A is false of it at every time. For example if

جَ أبيض دائمًا، ثمّ إتّفق في وقت ما أن لم يكن شيء من المتحرّكين أو من

the *C* is permanently white, and it happens to be true at a certain time that   132.15
nothing that is moving (i.e.

الباءات أبيض، فيكون حينئذ لا شيء من جَ الموجود في ذلك الوقت بباء في ذلك

an *A*) is white, then in this case no *C* which exists at the given time is an *A*
'at that
{Correcting the two *B*s to *A*s as required by the context. This could be Ibn
Sīnā's slip since he swapped *A* and *B* around a little earlier. }

الوقت، لا في كلّ وقت. فتكون النتيجة مطلقة على نحو إستعمالهم الإطلاق.

time' — not 'at all times'. So the conclusion is absolute, [but only] accord-
ing to their usage of the word 'absolute'.
{NB There is something not being said here. If we can take '*A* that exists
at time *t*' as a single term, then we have a straightforward Camestres and
there is no need to examine the form of the condition. Consider in con-
nection with the question where the line between core and adjunction is
drawn. }

فهذه الإتّفاقات كلّها إذا إتّفقت أنتجت هذه النتيجة. لكن ليس يجب من نفس

[3.1.24] So if all these things happen, then when they happen they entail   132.18
this conclusion. But the facts of the matter don't necessarily

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الأمر أن يتّفق هذه الإتّفاقات. وذلك أنّا إذا قلنا: كلّ لون كسوف فإنّه
happen like that. Thus if we say:

(35)   Every colour in the shade is with necessity a black colour.

{NB Because of the truth of the sentence, the quantification is over a singleton? No, because for Ibn Sīnā a 'colour' can be an instance of a colour.
}

بالدرورة سواد؛ ثمّ إتّفق في وقت إن لم يكن شيء من ألوان الأجرام السماويّة
Then it happens that

(36)   At a certain time, no colour of the heavenly bodies is a black colour.

سوادا، إذ هذا على هذه الطريقة وجودي، لم يجب من هذا أن يسلب السواد
and this proposition in the form that it has is an impermanent proposition.
But 'black' doesn't have to be false
{The ms that reads *wa-* for *'iḏ* clearly has a point, though Ibn Sīnā is quite
capable of writing *'iḏ*. }

عن الكسوفات الموجودة في الوقت حتّى تكون القضيّة وجوديّة. فربّما لم تكن
of things in the shade which exist at the given time in order for the proposition [(36)] to be true. In fact it could be that there are no things in the shade [at that time]
{Reading *mawjūdatan* for *wujūdiyyatan*; no ms support but I think the sense requires it, and one can see how a copyist retained *wujūdī* from the previous line. }

كسوفات موجودة حتّى يسلب عنها. وأيضا لم يجب أن ينعكس، فيقال:
for 'black' to be false of. Also (36) doesn't have to convert to the form   133.5
{NB Again the obstacle to converting lies in the choice of where to draw the line between core and condition. Reducing the core allows more kinds of inference but it may run into difficulties with inference types not recognised by Ibn Sīnā. }

ولا واحد ممّا هو سواد موجود هو لون الفلك. فربّما لم يكن حينئذ سواد

(37)   Not one black colour in existence is the colour of the heavenly sphere.

It could be in this case that there is nothing black,

موجود لأنّهم يجوزون أن يقول القائل: ليس شيء من الألوان سوادا، أيّ

because they permit someone to say

(38)   No colour is black, i.e. at a certain time.

{'They': people in general, or specifically Aristotle or his tradition? }

في وقت ما. وفي ذلك الوقت يصدق أن يقال: لا شيء من الألوان السماويّة

Then it is true that

(39)   No colour in the heavens at that time is the colour black.

{I altered the order. But it seems to be needed at (133.10), since without the time incorporated in the proposition, there is no obstacle to converting. }
{NB The effect is that the time of evaluation becomes part of the proposition. }

بسواد. ويكون القول حينئذ صادقا مطلقا. ثمّ لا ينعكس هذا حتّى يرجع إلى

And in this case the sentence is true and absolute. But then it doesn't convert so as to reduce the syllogism to

الشكل الأوّل.

the first figure.   133.10

ولكنّ لقائل أن يقول: إنّ هذا السلب الكلّي صادق، وليس الشرط أن

[3.1.25] But one should say: 133.11

In fact this negative universally quantified proposition is true [anyway]. The condition that

يكون الموضوع موجودا في الوقت إلّا في الموجب، لأنّ الإيجاب في
وقت معيّن

the subject term is satisfied at the time only applies if the proposition is affirmative, because an affirmation about a determinate time

لا يكون إلّا على موجود في ذلك الوقت. وأمّا السلب فقد يصدق على
الموجود

can only be true when its subject term is satisfied at that time,
whereas a denial can be true when its subject term is satisfied
{NB Affirmative sentence with specific time attached to subject
term is only about things existing at that time. }

والمعدوم. فربّما صدق عليهما في كلّ وقت، وربّما صدق في وقت معيّن.

and also when its subject term is unsatisfied. Thus a negative
statement can state a truth about its subject term both when the
subject term is satisfied and when it isn't, and the truth can be
about all times or about a specified time.

والاعتبار مقصور على صدق الحكم على الموضوع. فإن كان دائما فهو
ضروري،

But the thing to consider is [not whether the subject term is sat-
isfied but] whether what is asserted of the subject term is true.
If [the proposition states that what is asserted] is true perma-
nently then the proposition is a necessity proposition;
{NB The *ḥukm* here is clearly what is asserted of the subject
term. Note also: his statement suggests he is talking about eval-
uating the proposition, but his example shows that in fact he is
talking about what the proposition asserts about the truth of its
core. }

133.15

وإن كان موجودا، ولكنّ في وقت ما، فهو مطلق وجودي. ثمّ قولنا: كلّ

if [it states that what is asserted] is true at a certain time, then it
is an absolute impermanent proposition. So then if we say:

بَ كيف كان، فإنّه مسلوب عنه آ في هذا الوقت، قول صادق في هذا
الوقت.

(40)   Every *B*, however it is, has *A* false of it at such-and-
         such a time.

25

the sentence [says that the negative assertion] is true at this time.
{NB True at a time?}

إذا لم يوجد في هذا الوقت بّ موصوفا بأنّه آ ، سواء كانت البا آ ت
موجودة،

If at this time the term B does not satisfy the description A, then regardless of whether there are or are not any Bs,
{NB not [B] is satisfied but [THE B's] is satisfied. }

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أو معدومة لا توصف ب آ . فإنّ المعدومات لا توصف ب آ . والموجودات إذا

the term doesn't satisfy the description *A*. When there are no *B*s, then the *B*s don't satisfy the description *A*. When there are some *B*s and

لم توصف مع ذلك ب آ ، لم يكن في ذلك الوقت شيء هو بَ وهو آ . فيصدق السلب

moreover the *B*s don't satisfy the description *A*, then at that time there is nothing that is both a *B* and an *A*. So [either way,] the negative universally quantified proposition is true

الكلّي في الوقت؛ بل لهم أن ينحرفوا عن هذا إلى طريقة لهم قريبة من هذا

at that time.

But it would be better if they left this issue to one side and pursued a path that would be more congenial to them than this,
{NB *taḥrīf.* }

في هذا الباب كنّا أومأنا إليها فيما سلف. ويلزمنا الآن أن نذكرها لهم، وذلك

and which we have already pointed out in this context. And now we need to spell it out for them,

لأنّ للقائل منهم أن يقول: إنّا إذا قلنا كلّ جَ هو بَ بالوجود، أيّ في وقت ما،

because one of them might well say: In fact when we say   134.5

(41)   Every *C* is a *B* with impermanence, i.e. at a certain time.

لا يجعل الوجود باعتبار واحد واحد من الموصوفات؛ بل يجعل الوجود للحصر،

this doesn't express that what is said is true of each subject individual separately; but rather it expresses that the quantified proposition is true.

فإنّا إذا قلنا: كلّ جَ بَ بالوجود يفهم منه معنيّان.

Thus when we say

(42)   Every C is a B, with truth.

this can be understood as having either of two meanings.

<div dir="rtl">أحدهما، أنّه قد وجد إن كان الصدق هو قولنا: إنّ كلّ جَ بَ بعدما لم يجب</div>

[3.1.26] One of them is that if we say   134.8

(43)   Every C is a B.

that is in fact the truth, though it can't be
{Where is the other? Also I read *'an* for *'in*. }

<div dir="rtl">ذلك في نفس الأمر؛ لأنّه ربّما كذب هذا الحصر في وقت آخر.</div>

an intrinsic truth because there could be another time when this quantifier
is false.

<div dir="rtl">ولا يلتفت في ذلك إلى حال بَ من جَ ، أنّه هل هو لواحد واحد منها وجودي</div>

[In this meaning] the proposition is not about the relationship of the term   134.10
B to the term C, namely whether for each separate subject individual B
holds in an impermanent

<div dir="rtl">أو ضروري. مثاله أنّا إذا قلنا في وقت من الأوقات لا بياض فيه ولا حمرة ولا
شيء</div>

or a necessary sense. An example is that when we say, at some time when
there is no white colour and no red colour or colour

<div dir="rtl">من الأوساط إن أمكن: إنّ كلّ لون فهو سواد، وصدق هذا في ذلك الوقت، ولم</div>

intermediate [between white and black] (assuming this is possible):

(44)   Every colour is black.

[In this meaning] this proposition would be true at that time, but not
{NB Here he explicitly uses a 'possible' time/situation. }

<div dir="rtl">يكن صدقا ضروريّا، لم يعن أن كلّ واحد ممّا هو موصوف بأنّه لون فإنّه
موجود</div>

a necessary truth. It would not be meant that every individual that fits the
description 'colour' does have

{NB He seems to be saying that the proposition is (narrow) absolute, but nevertheless not an absoluteness proposition.}

له وجودا غير ضروري أنّه سواد، حتّى يجوز أن يبقي ذلك الواحد موجود

'black colour' true of it, though not necessarily true, so that that individual can continue to have its

الذات أو موجود لونا وقد زال عنه أنّه سواد، حتّى يكون كأنّ حكمنا أيضا

essence instantiated, and be a colour, but cease to be black. That would be as if we had judged that

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135

<div dir="rtl">

إنّ كلّ واحد ممّا يوصف بأنّه لون في ذلك الوقت ليس دائما ما دام موجودا

</div>

(45)   Each thing fitting the description 'colour' at that time is not black
permanently and for as long as its essence continues to be satis-
fied — far from it!

<div dir="rtl">

لذات فهو سواد، كلّا. فإنّ الوجود الغير الضروري في قولنا هذا إنّما يعتبر

</div>

So in fact the non-necessary truth of this sentence of ours just has to do with

<div dir="rtl">

في صدق الحصر، لا في أنّ المحمول الغير ضروري لواحد، أو لكلّ.

</div>

the truth of the quantifier, and not with whether the non-necessary predi-
cation applies to a single individual or to all of them.

<div dir="rtl">

كذلك لا يلتفت في السالب إلى وجود الموضوع؛ بل إلى وجود صدق

</div>

[3.1.27] Likewise in the negative proposition the assertion is not about   135.4
whether the subject term is satisfied; rather it is about the satisfaction of the
truth
{NB Here he says affirmative must have satisfied subject and negative
doesn't need to. But unclear below. }

<div dir="rtl">

السلب الكلّي، وإن كان لا بدّ من وجود الموضوع في الموجب حتّى يصدق

</div>

of the universally quantified denial. Even if the subject term in an affirma-   135.5
tive proposition has to be satisfied if the quantifier is to be true,

<div dir="rtl">

الحصر، ولا بدّ من ذلك في السالب. فإنّه إذا كان لا شيء من الألوان في وقت ما

</div>

the position with the negative proposition has to be as we said. In fact if at
some particular time

<div dir="rtl">

بياضا، ولا شيء من المتوسّطات؛ بل كانت الألوان كلّها سوادا، ولم يكن لون

</div>

no colour is white or intermediate [between black and white], and all colours
are black and there is no [non-black] colour

<div dir="rtl">

البتّة، صدق أن لا شيء من الألوان في وقت ما بياض، أيّ في ذلك الوقت؛

</div>

at all, it is true that

(46)   No [non-black] colour is the colour white, at a certain time.

namely at that time.

لأنّ المعدوم لا يوصف بأنّه بياض ولا بشيء من الموجبات. وإذا لم يصدق

This is because an unsatisfied [subject] doesn't satisfy the description 'white colour' or have any affirmative property. When the affirmation is not true

الإجاب، صدق السلب ضرورة. فإذا رعينا ما نقوله، وإلتفتنا إلى وجود الصدق

the [corresponding] denial must be true. If we take care about what we say,   135.10
and pay regard to the satisfaction of the truth

في الحصر، أمكننا أن نعكس هذه القضيّة.

in the quantifier, it would be possible for us to convert this proposition.

فإن سلكوا هذه الطريقة، يكون قد

[3.1.28] If they were to follow the path I have presented, they would   135.11

كثّروا على أنفسهم أصناف القضايا، وحادوا عن الطريقة المثلي، بما إذا تأمّلت

discover for themselves the great number of different kinds of proposition, but also they would avoid the approach that is like mine which you will have learned about if you have thought about
{I'm not at all sure that this translation is correct, or that the text is. The word *al-miṭlī* doesn't convince. }
{NB Discover for themselves the many kinds of proposition. }

بعض ما سلف لك وقفت عليه. فإذا كان كلّ كسوف قمري سوادا، وكان لا شيء

some of what was explained to you earlier. Thus when we have

(47)   Every eclipse of the moon is a black colour.

and

(48)   No eclipse of the moon at time t is a black colour.

من الكسوفات القمريّة في وقت ما بسواد لأنّ الكسوفات كانت معدومة،

because there isn't an eclipse of the moon [at time t],
{An eclipse is anyway an event, not a colour. So there is some stretching of language. In English we say that a dress 'is a reddish colour' etc. }

فيكون لا شيء من كسوفات القمر في وقت ما بكسوف، وكذلك لا شيء من
الناس

then

(49)   No eclipse of the moon at time t is an eclipse [of the moon].

One gets in the same way that no person   135.15
{By assertoric Cesare. }

بناس، وكذلك في كلّ واحد من الأمور. وليس له أن يقول: إنّ معناه لا شيء

is a person, and likewise with all sorts of things. One shouldn't comment
that this means that no eclipse of the moon at time t is an existing eclipse.
{Here he rejects a use of quantification over possibly nonexistent things; or
is it over actual things that possibly don't satisfy the subject description? It
looks as if he rejects it because there is a simpler description, not because
it's incoherent in itself. }

من كسوفات القمر في وقت ما بكسوف موجود، فإنّه لم تكن كسوسات القمر
من

The fact is that there aren't any eclipses of the moon

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حيث أخذت هذا أكبر مأخوذة على أنّها موجودة. لكنّ له أن يقول: إنّي

when you take this major premise [(49)] as true. What one should say is rather:

في كلّ موضع إنّما أعتبر في المحمولات الّتي في المقدّمات السالبة المطلقة أن تكون

In every topic, with negative absolute premises I only consider whether their predicate terms are
{Why does he explicitly say 'absolute'? }

موجودات في ذلك الوقت فتثبت بعد ذلك أو تسلب، ولا أعتبر ذلك في الموضوعات

are true [of their subject terms] at that time, and on the strength of that the proposition is confirmed or denied; I don't consider whether the subject term of the

للسلب. فسنسلّم له ذلك.

negative proposition is satisfied. In future we will take this view for granted.

وإنّما طوّلنا الترديد في هذا الباب، لنزيد المتعلّم إستبصارا في هذا المعنى، بكثرة

[3.1.29] We have been lengthy and repetitious about this topic, so as to give the student a feeling for what the topic is about, by presenting the many   136.5

الإحترازات الّتي يحتاج أن يراعي في ترويج هذا المذهب، بعد ما فيه من ضياع

precautions that need to be taken into account when this approach is taken on board, even after

مقدّمات ووجوه فاضلة، ممّا قد وقف عليه قبل. فنقول: إنّه إذا كانت

the superfluous premises and modes have been disposed of. These are things that you have already learned. We say: Absolute propositions

المطلقات على هذه الصفات، أمكن أن يكون منها نتيجة مطلقة على هذه الصفة،

of the kind under discussion can have consequences that are also absolute propositions of this kind.

ولا يبالي فيها بأن تكون القضايا في أنفسها ضروريّة أو غير ضروريّة؛ بل

It's of no concern here whether the propositions in themselves are necessary or not necessary. Rather

يكون الإلتفات إلى الحصر، حتّى إذا كان حقّا أنّ بعض الألوان أسود بالضرورة،

one must pay attention to the quantifier. Thus when it is true that some   136.10
colour is black necessarily,

وبعض الحيوان إنسان بالضرورة، فعدمت سائر الألوان وسائر الحيوانات

and some animal is human necessarily, and there are no other colours or
other animals,

وبقي السواد والإنسان، وبقي البعض من الحيوان الّذي هو إنسان بالضرورة،

leaving just black and human, [i.e.] leaving only those animals that are
human necessarily,

والبعض من اللّون الّذي هو أسود بالضرورة، وكان حقّا أنّ كلّ حيوان حينئذ

and only those colours that are black necessarily, thereby making it true
that every animal

إنسان أو كلّ لون أسود، فكان الحمل ضروريّا والمقدّمة غير ضروريّا. وذلك

is a human, and every colour is black — [when all this holds,] then the predication is necessary but the premise is not a necessary proposition. This

لأنّ صدق الحصر إتّفق إتّفاقا وكان لا بالضرورة، بل مطلقا مثل صدق قولنا:

is because the truth of the quantifier just happens to be the case and is   136.15
absolute and not necessary. The truth of the sentence

كلّ حيوان إنسان. فإنّه وإن كان حمل الإنسان على كلّ واحد من أولئك

(50)   Every animal is human.

illustrates this. So even though 'human' is necessarily true of every single
one of those

الموصوفات بأنّها حيوانات ضروريّا، فإنّ صدق الحصر ليس بضروري.

things that fit the description 'animal', the truth of the quantifier is not a
necessary truth.

فيجب

[3.1.30] At the same time,   136.18

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أيضا أن يكون قولنا: كلّ حيوان متحرّك بالفعل يكون بالضرورة؛ إذ يجب
the sentence

(51)   Every animal moves in act.

has to be necessary, since it has to be the case

أن لا يلتفت إلى حال حيوان حيوان؛ بل إلى صدق القول بأنّ كلّ حيوان
that it is not concerned with the facts about the animals individually. Rather
it is about the truth of the statement that every animal

فإنّه متحرّك وقتا ما أو متنفّس وقتا ما. فيكون هذا الصدق موجودا في كلّ زمان،
moves at some time or breathes at some time. This truth holds at every
time.
{NB Nested temporal quantifiers. }

فإنّك في كلّ زمان إذا قلت: إنّ كلّ حيوان موجود له الحركة، لا ما دام ذاته
At whatever time you say

(52)   Every existing animal has movement — not while its essence
        continues satisfied, but rather whenever it moves.

موجودا، بل حين ما يتحرّك، يكون صادقا. ولا يكون هذا القول في وقت من
it is true; this sentence is never   137.5

الأوقات كاذبا. نعم يكون في وقت من الأوقات ليس كلّ حيوان متحرّكا.
false. I grant that there could be a time when not every animal is moving.

وهذا لا يناقض ذلك. فإنّه في الوقت الّذي يصدق أنّه ليس كلّ حيوان متحرّكا،
But (52) doesn't contradict that. Even at the time when it is true that no
animal is moving,
{NB *laysa kullu*. I think the sense requires here that *kullu* has the wider
scope, though more usually it's read the other way. }

أيّ في الوقت يصدق أيضا أنّ كلّ حيوان متحرّك أو متنفّس وقتا من الأوقات
at that same time it is also true that

(53)   Every animal moves or breathes at some time at which it exists.

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في وجوده، فإنّ هذا يصدق في كلّ وقت، وإن كان حيوان لا يتحرّك في وقت،

This sentence [(53)] is true at every time, even if an animal is not moving at some time,

إذ هذا لم يوجب الحركة في كلّ وقت. ويناقض بأن لا يكون حركة في وقت.

since (53) doesn't imply that there is movement at every time. It is contra-   137.10
dicted by there not being movement at any time,
{Grammar! *ḥaraka* with masculine verb! }

فبالحري أن تكون هذه القضيّة الكلّيّة ليست مطلقة. بل ضروريّة.

so it's reasonable to suppose that this universally quantified proposition [(51)] is not absolute but necessary.

وهم

[3.1.31] But [the Aristotelians]   137.11

يأخذونها مطلقة، ولا يأخذونها ضروريّة البتّة. وكذلك قولهم: كلّ متحرّك

take it as absolute, and not as necessary at all. Lkewise the sentence

(54)   Every moving thing changes.

متغيّر يجب أن لا تكون مطلقة، بل ضروريّة. وقد أخذها بعضهم مطلقة.

should be not absolute but necessary. But one of them took it as absolute,

وصدّق من جعل هذه كبرى في الأوّل مطلقة، فأنتج نتيجة مطلقة. وأيضا فماذا

and declared that a person who took it as an absolute major premise in the first figure, so as to derive an absolute conclusion, was right to do so. And also what
{Reading *ṣaddaqa* to get a plausible sense. }

يقولون في قول القائل: بعض الحيوان إنسان بالضرورة، وبعض اللّون سواد

do they say about someone who says the following?   137.15

(55)   Some animal is a human with necessity, and some colour is black with necessity.

بالضرورة؟ هل هي ضروريّة أو مطلقة؟ لكنّهم معترفون بأنّ هذه القضيّة

Is this proposition necessary or absolute? They recognise that this existentially quantified proposition
{NB I think it has to be 'necessary' rather than 'necessity proposition' here, because the proposition is explicitly a necessity proposition. Note the nested modality. }

الجزئيّة يجب أن تكون صادقة في كلّ وقت، ونقيضها كاذبا في كلّ وقت. فنجدهم

has to be true at every time, and its contradictory negation is false at every time — but we find them

قد نسوا السور فهم غير ملتفتين إلى السور. وكذلك قولنا: بالضرورة ليس كلّ

forgetting the quantifier, so they are not reading it in terms of [truth of] the quantifier. The same goes when we say

(56)   Necessarily not every animal is human.

حيوان إنسانا، فإنّهم معترفون بأنّ هذه القضيّة ضروريّة. يجب أن يكون جميع

They recognise this as a necessary proposition. But all these propositions have to be

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ذلك مطلقا إن كانت الضرورة إنّما ترعى في صدق السور، لا في إعتبار الحال بين

absolute if the necessity is just taken care of in terms of the truth of the
quantifier, rather than by considering the relation between
{NB *murā*^{c}*ā* is here explicitly of the necessity. }

المحمول والموضوع. فإن كان الإعتبار هو السور، فصدق هذا السور ليس
ضروريّا.

the predicate and the subject. If the thing being considered is the quantifier,
then the truth of this quantifier is not necessary.

وذلك لأنّهم يسلّمون أنّه قد يصدق وقتا آخر أنّ كلّ حيوان إنسان، ولا شيء من
الحيوان

This is because, as they grant, it can be true at different times that every
animal is human, and that no animal

بإنسان. فيكون صدق هاتين القضيّتين وجوديّا من جهة سوره في كلّ وقت.

is human. So the truth of these two propositions is impermanent from the
aspect of its quantifier, and this is the case at every time.

وكذلك أيضا إذا قلنا: كلّ إنسان حيوان فإنّهم كلّهم يعترفون بأنّ هذه القضيّة

Likewise also when we say   138.5

(57)   Every human is an animal.

They all recognise this as
{'All', so not just one person. }

ضروريّة. وعلى أصلهم، فإنّها لا تكون ضروريّة، بل تكون لو توهّمنا

a necessary proposition. But according to their principles it won't be a
necessary proposition. On the contrary, if we imagine

لا إنسان موجودا ـ على ما يفعلون هم ويقولون ـ لم يكن أحد من الناس

that no human exists — which is what they say they are doing — then [in
that situation] no human

حيوانا، على قياس قولهم: إنّ قولنا ليس ولا شيء من الكسوفات بكسوف،

is an animal. This is by analogy with their statement that

(58)   When we say 'No eclipse is an eclipse', i.e. an existing eclipse, this is a true sentence.

أيّ كسوف موجود، قول حقّ. وإذا كان يصحّ عندهم أن يكون قولنا

If according to them the sentence

كلّ حيوان أعجم صادقا في وقت من الأوقات، حين ما لا يكون إنسان البتّة

(59)   Every animal is dumb.

is true at some time, [i.e.] whenever there is no human at all   138.10

بموجود، وإذ يصحّ سلب الحيوان عن الإنسان الّذي ليس بموجود، فيصحّ حينئذ

in existence, and since it is true that no human is an animal when there are no humans, it follows that in this situation the sentence

أن يقال: ليس أحد من الناس بحيوان. فلا يكون إذن صدق قولنا: كلّ

(60)   Not one human is an animal.

is true. So the truth of the sentence (57)

إنسان حيوان، صدقا دائما، بل إنّما يكون صدقا وقتا ما، فلا تكون هذه

is not a permanent truth, but rather it is just a truth at a certain time. So this premise is not

المقدّمة ضروريّة، بل تكون ممكنة ويستعملونها ضروريّة. فكان يجب أن

a necessary proposition but a possible one, and yet they use it as a necessary one. They ought to

يمنعوا كون هذه القضايا ضروريّة، مع إعتقاد المذهب الّذي لهم. وعلى أنّ لهم أن

deny that these propositions are necessary, though this is contrary to the   138.15 doctrine of their school. Really what they should say it:

يقولوا: إنّا لو أجبنا إلى الإطلاق، راعينا الوقت الّذي نتكلّم فيه. وأمّا

If we were to accept it as absolute, we would take care of the time in which we are speaking. In dealing with

في الضرورة والإمكان فيراعي شيئًا آخر، فيكونون قد شوّشوا على أنفسهم.

the necessary and the possible, [Aristotle] goes in a different direction, so these people's muddle is their own.

{*ᶜalā ʾanfusihim* not common, but also at 135.12 above and at *ᶜIbāra* 118.9. }

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فهذه الأبحاث وما يشبهها صرفتنا عن الإلتفات إلى هذا الرأي، وسنستقصى

[3.1.32] These and similar enquiries divert us from paying attention to the theory that is under discussion, [namely the third mood (30)]. So we are going to put into the enquiries in the Appendices

ما يجب أن يقال من الزيادة على ما قلناه في أبحاث اللّواحق. فقد بان أنّ هذه

a close study of the other things that need to be said in addition to what we have already said about them. Anyway it is clear that this

القرينة تنتج ضروريّة. وكذلك القول في الرابع، إذا كانت الكبرى موجبة

premise-pair entails a necessity proposition. The same should be said about the fourth mood, where the major premise is an affirmative

مطلقة.

absoluteness proposition.
{This will be Camestres again. }

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